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Social Preferences and the Third Sector: Looking for a 
Microeconomic Foundation of the Local Development Path* 
 
Maria Rosaria Garofalo, Annamaria Nese 




The aim of the paper is to endorse the principle, recurrent in non-profit literature, 
that the third sector is an institution that supports the development process of 
economic systems. The third sector is considered as an institution that “favors, 
transmits and cements” the role of social preferences in a given economy and, in this 
way, it contributes to development.  The paper thus considers two stances taken up 
in economic theory: (i) the theory of social preferences; (ii) the modern theory of 
development. These two stances do not exclusively and specifically refer to the third 
sector, and they generally follow parallel paths, rarely being aware of each other: in 
the paper,  the  third sector is assumed to form a bridge between them in that social 
preferences are supposed to be one of the driving  forces in the change process of an 
economy.  
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Introduction 
Until the 1970s, in almost all European countries advocacy organizations 
prevail, often operating in autonomy with respect to  the welfare authorities. 
Since the ‘80s and the ‘90s, coherent with the processes reforming welfare,  
different forms of collaboration between the NPOs and governments emerge 
and get stronger, according to the decentralization aim of each country’s 
welfare policy (Borzaga & Santuari, 2000). In particular, since the 1990s the 
third sector as a whole has not only strengthened its relative economic weight 
in terms of GNP and employment (Salomon & Anheier, 1999), but it has also 
diversified its role, its organizational forms and its relations with the state and 
the market (Ben-Her & Gui, 2003).  
With regard to this historical path, the aim of the paper is to offer a further 
theoretical cue to highlight  the role of the third sector – as an institution 
alongside the state and the market- in the development of Western European 
countries. The third sector is considered here as an institution that “favors, 
transmits and cements” the role of social preferences in a given economy 
and, in this way, it contributes to development.  
Firstly, the paper  focuses on the microeconomic foundations of the third 
sector’s emergence and sustainability; secondly, it defines the concept of 
institution useful for the analysis of economic performance and development; 
and finally, it deals with the complementarities of the institutions operating 
within a given economy. Even if many different organizational forms populate 
the third sector, the latter is defined here according to the criterion of  the 
main activity’s sector (Ben-Her & Gui, 2003): in particular, the paper refers to 
the NPOs  producing and delivering welfare services and goods for social 
purposes. 
The starting point of this research is thus to consider microeconomic 
foundations of the third sector, stressing the supply-side aspect. In analyzing 
the motivations of individuals engaged  in voluntary non-profit activities, the 
theoretical  reference is the literature on non-selfish preferences, and, more 
specifically, the works in experimental economics  (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd & 
Fehr, 2005) focusing on the possible outcomes of social interaction when the 
population is composed of individuals with heterogeneous preferences 
(altruists, egoists, conditional co-operators, etc.). An outcome shared by most 
evidence is that when a population is mainly composed of free riders, also 
those inclined to cooperation end by adopting selfish behavior  (either 
because reciprocity feelings prevail or because isolated cooperative actions 
are considered useless and too costly).   In a more general way (and closer to 
our interests), it can be said that  “the more trust we put into institutions 
relying on the principle of the exchange of equivalents (i.e. the market), the 
more cultural traits and behavior norms in the society will reflect that principle” 
(Zamagni, 2005; the Authors’ translation).  
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On the contrary,  the third sector represents the institution that can favor the 
emergence of cooperative behaviors, by organizing and sustaining them 
through new laws and new organizational forms. 
Individual behavior in the non-profit activities  (e.g. voluntary services, 
donations, etc.) reveals that the motivations behind human actions are not 
only selfish, but they often reflect other values, such as fraternity, reciprocity, 
altruism, and these values permit other forms of social interactions, different 
from those based on the exchange of equivalents (as in the market) or on the 
compulsory contribution (as between citizens and the state)  (Zamagni, 2005). 
This kind of human behavior,  recognized as useful to society, is 
institutionalized and sustained  by  new laws, new organizational forms and  
new expectations (in that it has become standard  in certain settings). The 
third sector can be considered as an institution in that it defines the 
environment (or the broad system of norms, beliefs and “rules of the game”) 
in which NPOs can operate. The institution concept referred to here thus 
corresponds to Schotter’s (1986)  ”the way the game is played”, to Nelson 
and Sampat’s  (2001) “social technologies” and to North’s (1990) “formal and 
informal rules”.  More specifically, institutions shape productive pathways of 
“doing things” in contests involving human interaction (in the language of 
transaction costs,  institutions define less costly ways of doing certain 
activities, thus making such activities more attractive and easy). In this way 
institutions become a development factor.  
Finally, the paper focuses on the contribution of the non-profit sector to 
economic growth and development.  It considers the NPOs’ capacity to 
produce new kinds of goods and services:  for example, homes for battered 
women, social work for refuges and immigrants, senior services, infant 
schools, or, more generally, services reflecting demographic changes in the 
population (e.g., population aging, larger female participation in the labor 
market, etc.). The third sector is also innovative by implementing new means 
of production, in particular  new factor combinations and different 
organizational forms that foster inclination to cooperate, solidarity, sense of 
dignity and self-determination (e.g., favoring social inclusion or through 
governance models enhancing stakeholders’ participation in decision-making 
processes, etc.).  
In analyzing the contribution of the third sector to the development of an 
economy, the theoretical reference is the recent literature on development, 
focusing on the obstacles to the process of structural change of an economy 
and to the active participation of  all agents in all markets, obstacles 
characterizing “poverty trap” phenomena  (Bowles, 2003; Durlauf, 2006; Hoff, 
2000). 
The outlay of the paper is as follows: the first section briefly reviews the 
theory of social preferences; the second section deals  with the concept of  
institution; the third section introduces recent models in the development 
theory also to make non-economist readers more familiar with them. Given 
the extensive literature on non-selfish preferences and on development, these 
two theories will not be dealt with comprehensively, but will be selected in a 
way consistent with the idea being developed.  In economics, these theories 
do not exclusively and specifically refer to the third sector. They generally 
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follow parallel paths and rarely are aware of each other: in the paper, the third 
sector is assumed to form a bridge between them. The last issue is 
addressed in more detail in Section 4 which discusses  whether and how 
social preferences, and their agglomeration, can operate in favor of an 
economy’s local development. Only if these conditions are met, can the non-
profit sector play an important role in the development of the advanced 
economies.   
Section 5 draws some concluding remarks. 
1. Social preferences and the third sector 
Traditional theories of non-profit organizations  (e.g., Hansman, 1986; 
Weisbrod, 1986) have mainly focused on the individual motivations leading to 
consume goods and services offered by the NPOs instead of those offered by 
the market or by the state. These theories, focusing on the demand-side 
aspect,  have recognized  a “residual” role to the third sector, conceived as a 
solution to the well-known forms of market and state failures.   On the 
contrary, supply-side oriented theories (James, 1986; Young, 1980; Rose-
Ackerman, 1996) have had the merit of underlining that the NPOs are the 
result of autonomous behavior patterns, independent of market and state 
failures (Zamagni, 2002). For example, Rose–Ackerman (1996), with 
reference to altruism and non-profit entrepreneurship, has argued for the 
existence of motivations driving individual behavior that cannot be understood 
within the standard neoclassical framework but that “require a richer 
conception of individual utility function”.   
A further important issue is whether the non-profit sector effectively selects 
and reinforces non-selfish preferences in the society. Whether individuals 
engaged in voluntary non-profit activities are motivated by altruism, 
reciprocity, solidarity  or, simply, by a wish of social visibility , they all attach 
more importance to a social mission than to personal gain (Young, 1999;   
Sacco  & Zarri, 2006). When these organizations  are successful in 
coordinating human actions to the achievement of a social aim,  evidently 
they encourage cooperative behavior and the emergence of social trust. 
Putnam (1995, p. 2), for example, underlines that “networks of civic 
engagement foster study norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the 
emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate coordination and 
communication, amplify reputations and thus allow dilemmas of collective 
action to be resolved” .  
Relying on evidence drawn from the 1991 World Value Survey, Putnam 
(1995) reports a positive correlation between social trust and civic 
engagement both at a micro and at a macro level: firstly, members of 
associations are more likely to participate  in politics, to spend time with 
neighbors, and to express more social trust than non-members; secondly,   
density of associational membership and social trust are found to be 
significantly correlated across 35 countries considered in the same Survey. 
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As will be seen in more detail below, the theoretical research and the 
evidence produced in recent years about social preferences can be 
particularly useful in order to address the issue of emergence and 
sustainability of non-selfish (or social)  preferences in a society: several 
laboratory experiments not only support new hypotheses on individual 
behavior (altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, other than egoism) but they 
also point out that the presence of individuals with heterogeneous 
preferences can affect the functioning of competition, cooperation, and the 
outcome of collective actions .  
Furthermore, a lot of studies concerning social capital (in particular, the 
contribution of Coleman, 1988) have underlined that social trust and 
cooperative behavior improve the effectiveness of institutions and, at the 
same time, are sustained by “high quality” institutions (e.g., Tabellini, 2007). 
Section 1.1 briefly reviews the literature on social preferences; Section 1.2 
discusses issues relating to the endogenous formation and transmission of 
preferences, highlighting the role played by all the institutions that influence 
an economy’s performance.  
 
1.1 Altruistic preferences, preferences based upon 
reciprocity or upon inequity aversion 
Social preferences may correspond to reciprocity-based preferences, to 
inequity aversion or to altruistic preferences.  Conditional co-operators  are 
ready to cooperate if others cooperate, while strong reciprocators may also 
punish (at personal cost, if necessary) those unwilling to cooperate (Rabin, 
1993; Levine, 1998; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Falk & Fischbacher, 2005; 
Fishbacher and Gachter, 2008). Punishment is driven mainly by a ‘feeling of 
anger’ towards those performing ‘unfair’ actions. Individuals with preferences 
of inequity aversion pursue the fair distribution of resources (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999;  Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Finally, an unconditional altruist is willing to 
cooperate independently  of the contribution pattern of others (Becker, 1974).  
Theoretical research has supported various laboratory experiments 
conducted to test the explanatory capacity of models based upon non-selfish 
preferences. In particular, empirical evidence based on public goods games 
show that many  individuals are ready to cooperate, at least as long as the 
others do so, while  some others are ready to punish (at a personal cost) “free 
riders” (Andreoni, 1988; Fehr & Gachter, 2000;  Fischbacher, Gachter, & 
Fehr, 2001). These results are interesting in that  if all the agents were selfish, 
no one would decide to contribute or punish.  
If the literature based on laboratory trials abounds, many examples are also 
taken from real life: following Reingen (1982), Kahan (2005) stresses that non 
selfish individuals reciprocate the disposition of others in giving, or not,  to 
charity; Bowles and Gintis (2005, p. 381) maintain that individual motivations 
supporting peer monitoring and other aspects of community governance are 
captured by strong reciprocity, which is a “predisposition to cooperate in a 
collective enterprise, and a predisposition to punish those who violate norms, 
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both of which are individually costly but conductive to strong social capital”. 
Finally, relying on evidence from twenty firms in Lombardy, Sacconi and 
Grimalda (2005) highlight  the role of “conformist preferences” - a motivational 
structure similar to the one proposed by the models of reciprocity -  in the 
creation and sustainability of social enterprises. 
 A further task is to analyze the social and political repercussions generated 
by social preferences. More specifically, it is important to analyze the results 
of the interaction among individuals with different preferences (social or 
egoistic) while outlining possible differences from the results based on the 
neoclassical paradigm of self-regarding preferences.  
Evidence from public goods games  has shown that when players are given 
the possibility of punishing  free riders, they often do it, and thus almost all 
players end up by contributing   (Fehr & Gachter, 2000) . However, the 
preference-type composition of groups affects the contribution level and the 
contribution path systematically (Kurzman & Houser, 2005; Fishbacher & 
Gachter, 2008): e.g., groups with more co-operators exhibit higher 
cooperation levels than groups with more free riders.  This is why, in a highly 
cooperative cultural context, punishing those who do not cooperate is not a 
costly action; conversely, if cooperation is not widespread, punishing those 
who do not cooperate entails high costs, and strong reciprocators end up by 
following the majority and adopting selfish behavior (Bowles & Gintis, 2005).  
An important issue for our analysis is to understand the influence that the 
institutions can exert on individual behavior and on the effectiveness of rules.  
1.2 Endogeneity and transmission of social preferences: 
the role of the institutions 
If in many cases the assumptions of egoistic preferences in the neoclassical 
paradigm seem unsuited to describing individual behaviors, the same applies 
to the assumption concerning exogenous preferences. Bowles (1998) 
analyses the factors affecting the development and transmission of individual 
preferences. He finds that economic institutions affect the structure of social 
relations because they modify the desirability of certain behaviors: for 
example, behaviors aimed at building a good reputation for oneself, and 
ethical and moral principles in general, perform a more important role in the 
case of market failures, whereas complete, perfectly functioning markets 
reduce their desirability. Moreover, economic institutions, together with 
technology, determine work types and modes. Finally, the values and 
behaviors induced by a society’s economic institutions as described here are 
transmitted from generation to generation through education patterns 
imparted to children by their parents. In this process, the action of parents is 
often supplemented (and sometimes replaced) by that of the school system, 
which helps to spread the emerging cultural model at a particular stage of 
society’s development. 
Bowles’ analysis of preferences formation and transmission gives rise to 
some important policy guidelines: first, and above all, the endogenous nature 
of preferences must be taken into account when the effects of laws and 
  11 
policies are assessed; secondly, new, socially desirable behavioral models 
can be introduced by means of educational campaigns or rules stigmatizing 
antisocial behavior. 
The impact of social, legal and economic factors on the formation of 
preferences has been evidenced by several laboratory experiments (for a 
more detailed analysis, see Ostrom, 2005; Kahan, 2005; Bowles & Gintis, 
2005) and real-life cases. Fehr and Fischbacher (2005), for example, 
underline that “if people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption, or abuses 
of the welfare state are widespread, they themselves are more likely to 
cheat…it is therefore important that public policy prevents the initial 
unravelling of civic duties…(p. 167)”. Tabellini (2007), using data on 
European regions,  shows that culture (measured by trust, respect for others, 
and confidence in individual self-determination), recognized as an important 
and lasting determinant of economic performance,  is strongly correlated with 
the quality of institutions.  A likely explanation for the latter result is that 
democratic institutions – in all fields, economy, politics, organizations, etc. - 
provide a feeling of inclusion, dignity, self-determination in that they 
emphasize participation rights in decision-making processes (Frey, Benz & 
Stutzer, 2004). At the same time, culture affects the functioning of institutions: 
for example, Putnam (1993) shows how same formal rules have different 
effectiveness in Italian regions characterized by different social capital. 
The analysis of preference formation and transmission carried out in recent 
years thus stresses the complementarities among market, state, and 
communities (“by a community, we mean a group of people who interact 
directly, frequently, and in multi-faceted ways”, Bowles & Gintis, 20005, p. 
381).  In particular,  Bowles and Gintis (2005) outline that when individuals 
cooperate in their neighborhoods, in professional and business networks, in 
social organizations etc., they not only spread social desirable behavioral 
models but they also contribute to solving problems connected to state and 
market failures through mutual monitoring and the punishment of antisocial 
behavior. At the same time, if communities are to function well, they require 
an adequate legal and governmental context. 
2. The third sector as an institution 
Current debate still lacks a general and shared definition of ‘institution’. 
Among different definitions of institutions (a review is in Nelson & Sampat, 
2001), referred to here are those most suitable for conceptualizing the third 
sector as a new institution contributing to economic growth and development.  
North (1990) and North and Denzau (1994), for example, define institutions 
as ‘rules’ and classify them as “formal” – when they consist of  the entire legal 
framework of an economy – and “informal” – when they consist of  all the 
social norms, ethical values, shared mental models, ideologies and habits. 
The crucial aspect of this approach is the role attributed to the informal level. 
More specifically,  it is the combination between the formal and informal level 
of an institutional framework that determines its effectiveness: the  formal 
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level, for instance, shapes the interaction with public bodies, as evidenced by 
the process of welfare reform across Europe; in addition, the informal level 
affects the way in which private agents perceive and take advantage of the 
transaction opportunities created by (new) formal rules,  modify their 
aspirations, are inclined to innovate, cooperate, etc. 
Another point of reference here is Nelson and Sampat’s (2001)  proposal,  
whereby the concept of institutions is tied to standardized patterns of human 
behavior (“social technologies”) and  to the factors supporting these patterns. 
Nelson and Sampat state that the processes underlying economic activities 
require not only  “physical “ technologies,  but also “social” technologies . 
More specifically, physical technologies describe technical routines (involving 
specific materials and machineries) for “doing things”, while social 
technologies concern standard patterns of  behavior involving  the 
coordination of human actions (e.g. any division of labor, mode of labor 
coordination, etc.).  These patterns emerge as easier and less costly “ways of 
doing things” and, when they are recognized as useful to society, they are 
institutionalized and sustained  by new laws, new organizational forms  and 
new expectations (in that they have become standard behavior in certain 
settings) .  
According to the above-mentioned definitions, the third sector is an 
institution of an economy because it corresponds to laws, organizational 
forms, cultural beliefs and norms that make easier (or less costly) the 
production and delivery of goods and services for social aims. For example, in 
a recent extension of transaction cost theory analyzing the importance of non-
profits in an economy, Valentinov (2007) emphasizes that individuals, even if 
inclined to voluntary work, generally worry themselves with the problems of 
who deserves more assistance and whether the resources have been 
allocated efficiently. Non-profit organizations help reduce transaction costs 
(which in this case are mainly due to limited information), and this role is even 
more important in relation to small contributions (e.g., consider the fund-
raising activities that permits the collection of small contributions which 
otherwise would not be received).  
More generally, the third sector includes “new laws”, “new models of 
interactions”, “new models of organization of work” that foster inclination to 
cooperate, sense of dignity and self-determination (e.g., favoring social 
inclusion or through governance models enhancing stakeholders’ participation 
in decision-making processes, etc.).  
In this way, the third sector becomes an institution that favors the 
emergence of social preferences and promotes their diffusion through the 
introduction of models of production/allocation/exchange (recognized as 
useful and needed by society) consistent with those preferences. As the 
example given in the previous section have shown (for example, Gachter & 
Fishbacher, 2000) the emergence of such behavioral patterns may promote a 
virtuous circle since cooperative behavior becomes easier in more 
cooperative contests. 
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3. The modern approach to development 
This section deals with modern theories of development (Hoff & Stiglitz, 
2000; Ray, 2000), with particular reference to the main obstacles 
(characterizing “poverty trap” phenomena) to the process of structural change 
of an economy, to social inclusion and to democratic participation of all 
agents in all markets. 
These theories do not provide a general theoretical framework but offer 
multiple explanations for the fact that agents in backward areas “do not 
always avail themselves of the best opportunities afforded to them” (Banerjee 
& Duflo, 2005). The methodological approach of these models seems 
relevant in that it stresses the importance of the economic and institutional 
context for both individual choice models (i.e., the formation of preferences, 
productive and allocative patterns, distributive rules, etc.) and models of 
interaction between individual agents (i.e., cooperation, coordination, 
defection, etc.), as well as the impact of individual choices and their 
interactions on an economy’s various markets. 
The following subsections refer, respectively, to a definition of development 
process in which the third sector can play an ever-increasing role in the future 
(3.1) and to the main factors characterizing poverty trap phenomena (3.2). 
3.1 The development process: a feasible view 
A first step consists in clarifying the definition of development referred to in 
the paper.  
In Schumpeter’s theory,  to which entrepreneurship theories of the third 
sector relate (Young, 1980), development is defined as the process of 
“carrying out new combinations” in the process of production” where the 
concept of “new combinations” refers to the introduction of new goods and 
services, new combinations of productive factors, new organizational forms, 
the activation of new markets  and linkages between them.  
More generally, development corresponds to a process of structural change 
of an economy and to the consequent improvement of individual living 
conditions, that can be measured not only as having  a higher purchasing 
power (on average) ex post but also as the broadening and the diversification 
of individual choice opportunities ex ante  (Sen,1999; Hoff, 2000; Bardhan, 
2004).  
The long-term path of Western European countries shows that the social 
dimension of development is important (Salvini & Mira D’Ercole, 2003). More 
specifically, the social dimension of development  is important because the 
widening of choice opportunities requires, in order to be effective, that change 
be made not only to the rules of income redistribution ex post (money 
transfers), but also to the rules on access to markets ex ante (labor, capital, 
education, knowledge, etc.)  (Rodrik , Subramanian. & Trebbi, 2004; 
Engermann & Sokoloff, 2000; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000).  
In order  to explain the long-term path of an economy and the differences 
between countries and regions, it is interesting to consider Ray’s (2000, p.8) 
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proposal of  a ‘methodological frontier’, focusing on the assumption that initial 
conditions or individual expectations are relevant. Ray’s key idea is that 
underdevelopment should be considered “not as a failure of some 
fundamental economic parameters or socio-economic values, but as an 
interacting ‘equilibrium’ that hangs together, precipitated by expectational 
inertia or by historical conditions”. This approach implies, on the one hand, 
that convergence across countries is not an automatic outcome, and on the 
other, that there are no ‘fundamental’ differences among an economy’s 
agents such to make them more or less willing to save, invest, innovate, 
cooperate, etc. In short, the idea is that these behaviors are related to the 
history of a country (for instance, to the inequality of initial conditions), or to 
individual expectations, motivations and cultural beliefs, which include how 
individual agents shape their aspirations and perceptions of opportunities and 
if they mutually coordinate their investments. 
A hypothesis which seems particularly suited to explaining the activation 
and sustainability of an economy’s change process has been recently 
suggested by  Ranis, Boozer, Stewart & Suri (2004). They focus on the 
existence of a two-way causation between economic growth (EG) and human 
development (HD), as represented below. 
 
Economic Growth ↔ Human Development 
 
The direction running from growth to development  evidences the proportion 
of income spent on the pursuit of social goals which improve human 
development. The direction from development to growth evidences that 
improved human development continues to support the growth process..  
Ranis et al. (2004)  introduce two novel features with respect to both new 
growth models and the Human Development Index approach (according to 
which high/low EG corresponds to high/low HD). The first is that HD is no 
longer the ultimate purpose of growth, nor is it a consumption good once 
subsistence has been accomplished. The second novelty is that HD is not a 
set of indicators (literacy, health, life expectancy) selected according to a 
restrictive view of Sen’s (1999) capabilities. HD therefore represents the 
ability and effective freedom of diverse agents to lead “full lives” centered on 
subjective and ethnocentric cultural values and moral norms.  
This bidirectional causation between EG and HD can activate virtuous or 
vicious circles according to the system’s initial conditions and  to the real 
transmission channels. More specifically, a virtuous circle, to be effective, 
requires a well-defined institutional asset in which, in our opinion, the third 
sector can become ever more important in that it promotes and sustains 
individual capabilities. 
3.2 Poverty traps and cumulative causation 
In light of the above-mentioned definition, the long-term path of an economy 
can be explained in several different ways. With particular reference to the 
approach of the modern theory of development, only some models of poverty 
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traps will be considered here. They will explain why agents do not always 
make the best use of resources implementing innovative models  (whereas 
innovative decisions represent the “driving force” of a change in an economy). 
It follows that  the so-called “propagation mechanisms” of the change are also 
slackened or obstructed (whereas the coordination of investment decision, 
the activation of new markets and their linkages, etc. represent the 
“propagation mechanisms”). 
 Applying a cross-reference to these models makes it possible to identify the 
following theoretical, methodological and policy ‘core’. 
 (i) From a theoretical perspective, the starting point is the assumption that 
the ‘trap’ is not ascribable to the agents’ insufficient effort, as if the 
institutional and economic context were irrelevant.  
  (ii) From a methodological point of view, these models rely on the 
cumulative causation mechanism (Hirschmann, 1958; Myrdal, 1968; 
Venables & Burgess, 2004), which may trigger a virtuous or vicious circle 
depending on the relevant economic and institutional context. As widely 
known, this circle comprises a ‘driving force’ which identifies the necessary 
conditions for new investments to be launched in any economy.  This circle 
also comprises a ‘mechanism of propagation’  which identifies sufficient 
conditions for  new investments to increase and diversify transactions on the 
economy’s various markets, and to generate self-reinforcing development 
paths. The positive or negative outcome of the development path depends on 
both thick market effects and the nature of the psychological motivations and 
cultural beliefs that shape economic behavior. This mechanism of cumulative 
causation suggests a methodological framework  able to explain whether and 
how social preferences, transmitted by NPOs at local level, exert an impact 
on an economy’s development path: as will be seen in more detail in Section 
4, in our opinion, social preferences constitute the “driving force”, while the 
creation and the sustainability of social markets are the “mechanisms of 
propagation”.  
(iii) In terms of policy approach, poverty trap phenomena are considered to 
be cases which give legitimacy to policy interventionism. However, this does 
not necessarily or exclusively entail government interventionism; rather, it 
requires the coordination of policy makers with private agents operating at 
different levels or in different sectors of an economy (Matsuyama, 1996). This 
can be defined as a coordinated institutional system, which is one of the 
novelties of welfare reform in EU.  
More specifically, the taxonomy of poverty trap models, recently drawn up 
by Bowles et al., identifies three classes of models. The first class is based on 
the hypothesis of a  ‘critical threshold’ (Azariadis & Drazen, 1990) in capital 
stock (physical, human or social) which enables an economy to start its 
development path, or otherwise. It is meaningful to consider the 
consequences of low human capital stock (the driving force) on agents’ 
education choices (the mechanism of propagation), which in turn affect long-
run equilibrium. The “vicious circle” consists of the fact that the low human 
capital stock reduces the intentions of both firms and families to innovate or 
invest: more specifically,  there are scant opportunities for firms to shift from 
traditional to innovative activities or sectors, so that  firms are not encouraged 
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to innovate; in turn, families do not invest in education because the 
possibilities of finding  appropriate jobs are low (with high “search costs”).  
A second class of models deals with the role played by institutions within an 
economy (Banerjee & Duflo, 2005; Bowles, 2006). Several studies have been 
conducted on various types of government failure. These types of failure 
‘distort’ private investment decisions because the protection levels of private 
productive activities are too high or too low. This causes the economy to 
depend on public policies. These failures also produce an insufficient and 
standardized supply of  public goods; they do not foster coordination and 
cooperation among businesses, with the obvious consequence that they are 
unwilling to introduce innovations whose benefits are not completely 
internalized (Ciccone & Matsuyama, 1996).  
The last class of models explains poverty traps on the basis of agents’ 
membership, in contexts where exchanges are assumed not to be regulated 
by market conditions alone, but by the entire set of social norms (ethical 
values, habitual behavior, shared mental models). The idea is that agents 
adopt behavior which is widespread within an economy, and if these 
behaviors are ‘bad’ they discourage ‘good’ ones. These poverty trap models 
highlight the fact that the long-run path of an economy in different local 
contexts depends on whether the initial conditions or innovative actions  (and 
their agglomerative effects) prevail. In the first case, the unequal initial 
conditions imply the persistence of an unequal outcome, and the economy is 
trapped in a sub-optimal equilibrium. In the latter case, the long-term 
equilibrium depends on the complementarities activated by agents’ 
expectations – which may be optimistic or pessimistic: “beliefs that a bad 
outcome will occur do come true in the sense that such beliefs precipitate bad 
outcomes” (Ray, 2000, p. 16) The complementarities among agents’ 
expectations are of crucial importance because, if agents share the belief that 
all agents will shift from the traditional to the emerging sector, they will all be 
encouraged to take action and to invest immediately to obtain greater benefits 
from innovation.  
4. Bridging development and other-regarding preferences  
The hypothesis of a two-way causation between growth and human 
development recently proposed by Ranis et al.  (2004) seems particularly 
suited to explaining how the third sector contributes to the activation and 
sustainability of a change process within an economy. According to this 
hypothesis, the third sector is an important institutional actor in intercepting 
and sustaining the link between economic growth and human development in 
both directions.   For instance, the most recent literature on poverty traps 
highlights the reason why individuals are not always, and/or not all, able to 
exploit the advantages offered by the new opportunities in an economy. 
The third sector, on one hand,  favors the active  participation of all agents  
in all markets and in the voluntary supply of public goods: it does so by 
furnishing welfare services with high relational content and goods of collective 
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interest, social inclusion, quality in employment relationships and in the 
delivery of services, incentives to innovate governance models (internally and 
externally to non-profits). This contribution, carried out particularly by the 
productive component of the third sector (i.e., social cooperatives and social 
enterprises) has been  largely documented across Western Europe, taking 
into account the features characterizing the development level and the 
institutional welfare policies  in each country (EMES European Network, 
1999; Defourny & Nyssen, 2008). 
On the other hand, the third sector promotes a culture of heterogeneity both 
in the motivations for economic action and in the consequent implementation 
of organizational models because it brings out other-regarding patterns of 
behavior (within a population) and, above all, fosters them by giving visibility 
and legitimacy to operational rules (on coordination, cooperation, reciprocity 
etc.) and to the results (often superior to the outcomes of market interactions 
in terms of both efficiency and social desirability). Referring once again  to the 
increasing economic weight of the NPOs in the development process of 
Western European countries,  the productive component of the third sector 
plays an effective role when intrinsic pro-social preferences and extrinsic 
monetary motivations come together, thus making more effective non-
monetary incentive mechanisms: in particular, the social mission affects the 
achievement of social goals, and, in turn, the economic capability reinforces 
the economic weight of the social mission. Naturally, isomorphic cases in the 
third sector must be taken into account: one hypothesis  is the weakening of 
the mission compared to the profit scope; the other is the weakening of the 
entrepreneurship capabilities, leading to dependence on public subsidies. 
When these situations occur, the third sector’s capability of  sustaining the 
development of an economy in the long-run  is weakened (EMES European 
Network, 1999; Defourny & Nyssen, 2008). 
Section 4.1 , according to an extensive interpretation of the model 
developed by Ranis et al. (2004), considers the role of the third sector in the 
cumulative causation , in the direction running from EG to HD.  It discusses 
the traps caused by the ‘threshold effect’ (i.e., the first class of models 
identified in Section 3.2) or by ‘institutional failures’ (the second class of trap 
models). Section 4.2 considers the link running from HD to EG, with reference 
to the trap created by the ‘membership effect’ (the third class of trap). 
    4.1 From growth to human development 
The third sector’s role, in the link running from growth to human 
development,  lies at micro level, in that it occupies the spaces opened up by 
state and market failures: the third sector helps increase and diversify the 
composition of output and aggregate employment, so that it increases – in an 
egalitarian direction – and diversifies the choices available to agents in 
markets.  
With reference to the productive component of non-profits, the recent rise 
and spread of the social enterprise in Europe (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001) 
contributes firstly to satisfying the Keynesian macroeconomic condition for 
growth: namely change in the composition of aggregate demand in which 
services predominate (especially welfare services and goods of collective 
importance). Secondly, it sustains the system’s level of production and 
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productivity, for instance by making specific investments in human capital in 
new sectors, or by attracting financial resources and innovations (Lorentz & 
Savona, 2007).  
If the driving force behind the process of cumulative causation is the 
emergence of this productive component visible in the third sector’s 
increasing contribution to GDP and employment, the process is virtuous if it 
activates propagation mechanisms. One of these mechanisms is indubitably 
the labor market: (i) investment in human capital for the creation of a pool of 
workers specialized in social management (fund-raising, social reporting, 
mission balance sheet, participative organization of human resources, social 
service provision, needs recognition, horizontal and vertical institutional 
networking with for-profit enterprises and public institutions); (ii) action against 
the depletion of human capital through the mobilization of specialized labor in 
voluntary organizations (unemployed doctors, women re-entering the labor 
market, etc.); (iii) the reintegration of disadvantaged persons into 
employment; (iv) the creation of a pool of specialized workers stimulates 
enterprises to innovate their production processes, and it increases demand 
for new skills, with positive impacts on recruitment/job-search costs and on 
the competitiveness of the third sector’s production. The other propagator 
mechanism is the welfare services market: the increase in disposable income 
not only indirectly supports demand but also diversifies consumption patterns 
through the activation of new needs. 
As suggested by models of the poverty trap caused by the ‘threshold effect’, 
the process is virtuous only if the benefits from the productive component of 
the third sector are substantial and persistent: that is, if they reach a 
‘minimum threshold’ below which is not economically convenient to make 
specific investments and, conversely, above which workers and enterprises 
perceive and exploit this new opportunity for income and employment 
because the stock of capital accumulated in the sector yields increasing 
returns to scale on the investment (because, for instance, voluntary work is 
not undertaken by sporadic and isolated bodies but  draws vitality from 
institutional complementarities with other productive and distributive actors).  
The role of the third sector  in the link running from growth to human 
development is also suggested by the models of the poverty trap caused by 
‘institutional failures’: for instance, when prevalent in an economy are rules 
that protect rent-seeking behavior or exacerbate the unequal distribution of 
assets and, therefore, of decision-making power among agents. A 
mechanism that propagates the virtuous circle is redefinition of the rules 
governing access to the various markets so that advantage is taken of the 
new opportunities for active participation furnished by the emergence of the 
third sector’s productive component: a striking example is the introduction of 
micro-credit for social cooperatives (and for social cooperatives with large 
female components) where the elements used to evaluate creditworthiness 
are the quality of the social services delivered, the participative nature of the 
productive model, and the ethical purpose of the production. 
In this case, too, the equilibrium solution is not automatically virtuous, given 
reform of the institutional system in an egalitarian direction, because an 
increase in  opportunities is not enough. In other words, formal rules of 
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access to the market is not an incentive sufficient in itself to foster innovative 
models and spread them within a population. 
 
4.2 From human development to growth 
The multiplier and accelerator effect of income (and of employment), in the 
presence of a new composition of final demand, can explain some of the story 
(positive, indirect and/or direct pecuniary externalities in virtuous cases). 
Nevertheless, if the mechanism of cumulative causation goes no further, 
there is nothing new in the virtuous path which an economy can follow. 
The crucial issue is whether the third sector can help form a new culture of 
civil cohabitation that generates (cooperative) outcomes of social interactions 
different from those assumed by the neoclassical paradigm of self-regarding 
preferences. The literature cited in Section 1 has amply documented the 
presence of both self-interested and other-regarding preferences in the 
collectivity; the key question concerns which of these behaviors predominates 
and the possible role of the institutions.  As stressed in the literature (Bowles, 
1988; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005), the economic institutions can greatly 
influence the structure of social relations, not only by heightening the 
effectiveness of norms but also by modifying the desirability of certain 
behaviors. The task of promoting and spreading behavioral models based on 
altruism and cooperation cannot be undertaken either by the market or by the 
state because, in the former everything is reduced to the exchange of 
equivalents, and in the latter to welfare transfers made possible by 
‘compulsory’ contributions from citizens (Zamagni, 2005). 
The third sector, by contrast, is not solely the expression of other-regarding 
preferences in the community. Above all, it demonstrates the efficacy of 
cooperative schemes and participation in collective action in particular 
circumstances: the aggregate, repeated and successful effects of non-profits 
in various domains can thus perform an important role as mechanisms which 
propagate a culture of cooperation, altruism and reciprocity by selecting, 
activating and supporting pro-social preferences (on this point, see also 
Borzaga, 2007). The third sector is, we maintain, precisely the institution 
which not only organizes, but is also more efficiently able to determine, the 
emergence and spread of cooperative patterns of behavior which might 
otherwise remain only sporadic and isolated. 
The other part of the story, therefore, is explained by the distinctive role of 
the social enterprise as an institutional innovation for development in different 
forms and through different channels of emergence, adoption, success and 
diffusion which can be summarized as follows: (i) the nature of the output and 
the processes of production/delivery of welfare services and goods of social 
importance transmit a set of ethical values, cultural models, and psychological 
motivations in exchange, as well as not exclusively self-interested and 
monetary attitudes; (ii) the novelty with respect to instrumental rational choice 
is that ‘values’ and ‘beliefs’ are the origins and determinants of economic 
action and its performance: for instance, the opportunity-cost of time among 
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work, leisure, and availability to others is altered; the free transfer of private 
knowledge is facilitated; non-hierarchical criteria for the division of labor are 
introduced; and active participation in markets is promoted as a right; (iii) the 
trust in oneself and others fostered by non-profits (Sacco & Zarri, 2006) is an 
important input to the efficiency of the economic system and for the 
improvement of human development of a community (Coleman, 1988; Sen, 
2000; Tabellini, 2007). 
According to our interpretation, leaving out isomorphic cases, the third 
sector performs an important role in the process of cumulative causation (in 
the direction running from human development to growth), not so much 
because of the nature of the goods and services produced or because of the 
distribution of its benefits, but because it alters poverty trap phenomena due 
to the imitation and persistence of traditional forms of behavior (largely rent-
seeking and self-regarding) and characterized, moreover, by a low propensity 
to invest and innovate (as in the third category of poverty trap models). 
5. Concluding remarks: social preferences, local 
development and the role of the third sector   
Following a selective review of the literature on different theoretical 
approaches, the paper has identified the key ideas to explain, in the future, 
whether and how the third sector will impact on the development of different 
territorial contexts, and whether and how it can contribute to overcoming 
poverty trap phenomena.  
Firstly, the literature on social preferences has highlighted that individual 
behaviors in society are very often motivated by other-regarding 
considerations. When individuals cooperate in their neighborhoods, in 
workplaces, in social organizations, etc., they contribute to building socially 
desirable equilibria.  Activating and sustaining the deepest motivations of 
individuals is an important opportunity for democracies to solve problems 
connected to state and market failures (Ostrom, 2005; Fitoussi, 2004). 
Secondly, the modern theory of development suggests two interpretations 
of the third sector as an institution of an economy: i) the effectiveness of the 
third sector depends on its ‘local embeddedness’ both in terms of economic 
activities and of the other actors making up the institutional framework; ii) in 
turn, this local embeddedness may be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, meaning that it 
can trigger either a ‘virtuous’ or a ‘vicious’ circle, depending on the initial 
conditions captured by various types of market failures and coordination 
failures (poverty traps).  
Preferences and territorial contexts evolve together, generating equilibria 
which may be either path-dependent or driven by optimistic expectations 
(Ray, 2000).  
Hence, by giving a broad interpretation to the model of two-way causation 
between growth and development proposed by Ranis et al. (2004), the paper 
has highlighted the third sector’s potential role in the development of the 
advanced economies: (i) the third sector is an important institution for 
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development because, on the one hand, it contributes to modifying individual 
expectations, thus becoming one of an economy’s ‘social technologies’ and 
increasing opportunities in terms of agents’ income, employment and 
exchange, and on the other, it can activate strategic complementarities 
between agents (externalities); (ii) the third sector selects, activates and 
sustains values and behaviors such as the cooperation, trust in others and in 
oneself essential (and irreplaceable) to achieve results in terms of efficiency 
and growth.  
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